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Authority MM 974352By WV NARA Date 9/4/01

AF FORM 112—PART I

APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948

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COUNTRY GERMANY	REPORT NO. 59A-B-2673 B	(LEAVE BLANK)
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
SUBJECT Administration of VORKUTA Area		
AREA REPORTED ON VORKUTA, USSR	FROM (Agency) 7050TH AISW (USAFE)	
DATE OF REPORT 22-24, 27-29 Sep 54	DATE OF INFORMATION Aug 49 - May 53	EVALUATION F-6
PREPARED BY (Officer) EDWARD E LUNDAK, Lt Col, USAF	SOURCE 190326	
REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable)		
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 112—Part II.)		
<p>I. PREAMBLE:</p> <p>SOURCE, interned as political prisoner from Aug 49 to May 53 in Forced Labor Camp # 9, Pt 16, Incl 1, report A, in VORKUTA (6730N-6403E) was most of the period foreman and camp commander of camp # 9, from Mar 51 to Aug 52. As latter, he contacted personally many officers and visited their offices, had very often the opportunity to read the official reports and regulations, partly officially partly by chance. He was especially in confidence with Security Officer KOLESNIKOV, and had free access to his office at any time. Thus he knew the entire setup of the administration of VORKUTA area. He knew all the names of office holders of that time. On several days repeated cross questioning revealed that SOURCE never mixed up any name or office. All Russian words in this report are SOURCE'S spelling, and all info is based on personal observation.</p> <p>II. THE ADMINISTRATION.</p> <p>VORKUTA district was the most N section of the KOMI A.S.S.R., and as penal district had an elaborate administration. The government of the KOMI A.S.S.R. was either not directly concerned, or was of no importance. The only officials ever observed in the district were the 3,000 regular policemen of VORKUTA. They were subordinated to the KOMI government. The free civilian population of the district, however, not including the released but compulsory settled ex-prisoners were supposed to be citizens of the KOMI A.S.S.R. The seat of the KOMI district was at SEKRETARIARSK, coordinates unknown, located near the USA river W of ABEZ (6629N-6149E). Of this setup nothing was known except for the project to transfer the entire district government or regional administration to VORKUTA in near future. The new administration center of VORKUTA city was already projected in 1951, partly lined out and under constr in 1952 in the E-section of the town, NE of the RR station "KOM SOMOLSKAYA", Pt 32, Incl 1, report A. It was supposed to house the entire administration with each department in own large office bldgs, with mining and technical high schools, university and large modern research laboratories. The project had priority in the development for VORKUTA, and was to be achieved within 5 years.</p> <p>THE ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION.</p> <p>Ref made to Incl 1, this report, Memory Sketch of Organizational Breakdown of Administration of VORKUTA-DISTRICT, VORKUTA (6730N-6403E).</p> <p><u>1</u> INCL.</p> <p># 1. Memory Sketch of Organizational Breakdown of Administration of VORKUTA-DISTRICT, p. 18.</p>		
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VORKUTA-DISTRICT was only a section of the penal area, known as "VORKUTA-PECHORA Coal Basin". The seat of the administration of this penal area was in VORKUTA. All regulations and orders came directly from MOSKVA (5545N-3737E) from the concerned ministries. The area president of administration held the title of Representative of the Minister of Interior for the district VORKUTA/PECHORA Coal Basin. He had actually 2 setups similar in organization and function, one in VORKUTA, more important than the other one in PECHORA. He was not the independent governor, because all his orders had to be acknowledged and countersigned by the chief in office of the Headquarters of the Minister of State Security, NKVD and MVD. Usually both officials acted on mutual understanding, but whenever the security chief threw in his veto or refused to sign, the governor's order was void, and higher headquarters decided. It occasionally happened that the veto of the security chief overruled even orders of the Minister of the Interior of USSR. A third independent department with ruling authority, directly subordinated the Minister for Health and Welfare was the district medical department. The first mentioned two officials could neither give orders to the medical department nor overrule their orders, but only could express wishes. This department was independent in the same position, offices in all divisions of administration right down the line in direct channel of command, Pt C. The chief medical officer was entitled to issue orders to the subordinated administration chiefs down the line without approval of the governor and the chief security officer. The governor operated with three department of his jurisdiction, such as the State Security, the Operation and the Military Commander in Chief of the area. All these 6 offices were in combination the superior administration, and held the entire area VORKUTA in their jurisdiction. The area was divided into several districts, one of which was VORKUTA-DISTRICT. The total number of districts was unknown, but SOURCE stated that the entire area N and NE, toward E and far down toward S were under jurisdiction of VORKUTA. Each district had its own administration. The setup was identical one to another. Two sections existed, both about equal in power. In general each section was independent of each other, but worked in cooperation. The direct communication, however, was possible by the respective chiefs, or their assistants. Communication between subordinated offices, or between one chief and a subordinated office of the other section did not exist. All inter-district correspondence went through channel, Pt D. The one section in charge of all the installations, such as the mines, their outside installations and the overall development of the district, including transportation. It was generally known as the "Combinate VORKUTA". It had 9 departments, including the department of the chief engineer. The 2 first ranking departments were the Secretary of Communist Party, and the Operation department. The latter was responsible for the actual work and besides for registry of all compulsory settlers and released prisoners. The Medical department was a separate detachment which did not take orders from the Combinate chief, considering his wishes only. The other section of the district administration was the Headquarters of all forced and penal labor camps, including PW camps. This office had no departments, but worked the supervision of the camps and the labor centrally. Starting from here the administrative net grew closely meshed. Each coal mine and major installation of the district had an own administrative body with setup similar to the "Combinate", but on smaller scale. The attached labor camp or camps had separate administration. Example on sketch is given of coal mine # 8, Pt 52, Incl 1, report A, and its labor camp # 9, Pt 16, Incl 1, report A. The camp administration was divided into departments, each furnished with own authority in its sector. The cooperation between the main sections was identical to those of the district administration, Pt E. In order to eliminate unnecessary correspondence usually the Secretary of the Communist Party or the Polit Officer of the mine or installation was simultaneously Security Officer or Polit Officer in the attached labor camp. Three channels of command existed. The most common channel, Pt A; the orders were given by the

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governor acknowledged by the chief of superior security, all chiefs of district and installations received copies. Usually the governor or the chief security officer did not contact minor departments or offices directly, but it was possible. While the governor could in no way operate without the security chief, the chief officer of State Security had an independent channel of command, Pt B. He gave direct orders to all section and department heads within the area, especially to all party and operative departments. The third channel of command, Pt C, concerned the medical department only. Reports were sent to higher headquarters in duplicate one for the governor, the other for superior chief of state security, and with as many copies as offices concerned.

The whole system of administration seemed to be very complicated and implicated. It, however, functioned, especially for the reason that nobody in office was absolutely trustworthy. The best fellow could possibly be an agent with secret orders and offices. The functions of the governmental offices and those of the state security department were overlapping at many points, that normally all office holders did everything to please both. The affect of this duplicate in command was noticeable right down the line. The general prisoner was especially impressed by the fact that detachments of Army soldiers and MVD soldiers pulled guard together at the same time and same sites. It frequently happened that both had different orders and were very strict in following same. In reality the orders should always be in concert because the governor was superior to both departments concerned, namely the State Security department and the Military Commander in Chief of the area. The affect was always the same, either the guards were bribed, or the denial of one category was not contradicted by the other.

The Personalities in Office were more or less known by SOURCE. In general he knew at least their names and functions. The entire atmosphere in the administration seemed to be based on corruption and illegal trade. Every officer apparently knew of the misdeeds of his fellow officers or were involved themselves. The progress in developing the area and in required production was going on, according to planning in spite of the disorder. The governor was Maj Gen, DIREVANKO, of Ukrainian nationality. About 65 years old, 180 cm tall, athletic figure, healthy complexion, dark gray hair, small trimmed mustache. He was respected for his knowledge and feared for his strictness. He was authorized to sign death penalties. He did not very often appear in public. The Chief of the superior State Security Department was Maj MISHANOV, 47 years old, height 170 cm, stout, weight 120 kg, thick dark blond hair. His face was pock-marked. In appearance he was typical morsore MVD officer, who feared nobody and nothing. The chief of the governor's state security department was Lt Col BANDERENKO, he seldom appeared in public. Part of his office was the military and civilian justice of VORKUTA-DISTRICT with him acting as attorney general. Chief of the Operation department was the Grusinian ABRAMOV. In absenteeism of the governor he signed as deputy. He was tall and skinny, and usually wore civilian clothing. He was the most hated individual of VORKUTA and specialized in hunting underground movements. The Military Commander in Chief of the area was Lt Gen SINKEVICH. 170 cm tall, stout, red face, a drinker. Apparently not overanxious and not very interested in his office. He was friendly whenever he appeared, never cursed as all others did, and was well liked by all soldiers. The superior Medical Officer was a woman, Lt Col KULIKOVA. 30 years old, 168 cm tall, blond, good womanly figure. Very well versed in her field, she was hated by the sanitary staff for her correctness but liked by all prisoners.

The Security Officer of the coal mine # 8, and simultaneously of camp # 9, the Lt KOLESNIKOV held an extremely outstanding position and office. SOURCE was his protege and knew him well. He was respected and feared by all, had direct correspondence with MOSKVA. Letters from high offices in MOSKVA addressed him as Maj Gen Feodor, Nikolayevich KOLESNIKOV. SOURCE had personally read the address several times. During SOURCE'S internment KOLESNIKOV attended MVD officer meetings in MOSKVA twice, on both occasions he wore a General's Uniform.

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He was born on 13 Nov 1907 in MOSKVA, was 182 cm tall, had an athletic stature, was extremely strong, blond full hair, healthy complexion, always well groomed. He spoke German and English fluently. He had an overall good education and manners. The impression was that of a real commander. He was a soldier, very often decorated, such as twice the order of "Hero of USSR", twice the order of KRASNIY ESNAMEIA (red flag), the order of LENIN, and many more. His sub title was "POMOSHNIK GENERALNEMO PROKURA, KOMI A.S.S.R.", meaning assistant attorney general of the KOMI A.S.S.R. He worked closely together with the chief security officer Maj MISHANOV, or better the other way round, MISHANOV with him. In VORKUTA KOLESNIKOV wore either officer's uniform without badge mark, or of Lt. He seemed to be informed about all events within the district and executed great influence in all offices. Wherever he appeared, he was saluted, even by the highest ranking officers in VORKUTA. Most of the time he was active in the district out of his personal office. He seemed to inspect and control all installations offices and camps in the district. After his inspection tours the corruption within offices and installations ceased at least for a while and those involved disappeared. The BLATNOIS called him the Terror, because he was their bitter enemy.

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COUNTRY GERMANY		REPORT NO. 59A-B-2673 C	(LEAVE BLANK)
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SUBJECT Personal Experiences in Russian Captivity			
AREA REPORTED ON VORKUTA, USSR		FROM (Agency) 7050TH AISW (USAFE)	
DATE OF REPORT 22-24, 27-29 Sep 54	DATE OF INFORMATION Aug 49 - May 53		EVALUATION F-6
PREPARED BY (Officer) EDWARD E LUNDAK, Lt Col, USAF		SOURCE 190326	
REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable)			
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 112—Part II.)			
I. PREAMBLE: SOURCE was arrested by a Soviet patrol on 12 Oct 1948 in HEILIGENSTADT, SZG, (5022N-1004E), when he tried to enter the RR station. He had crossed the international border illegally, intending to locate his relations. Since he carried discharge certificate as American PW and an American driving license on his person he was accused to be an American secret agent, tried and sentenced to 25 years labor camp in the USSR. SOURCE studied Russian language, and soon contacted several Russians, prisoners and free citizens even such of higher rank and in leading positions. Being a smart, slick person, he was able to dodge manual work and to obtain as prisoner positions of some importance and thus gained access to info which normally was unknown. He was granted special permit to move freely within VORKUTA (6730N-6403E)-town area. He, however, was usually accompanied by an unarmed guard. During his internment he lost his left arm and suffered lung troubles. His sentence was shortened and SOURCE was repatriated in Dec 53.			
II. PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN RUSSIAN CAPTIVITY. SOURCE was tried in GOTH A (5057N-1043E) and WEIMAR (5059N-1119E). During the trial he was not badly treated, however, all his pledges to be innocent were disregarded, and he was finally sentenced to 25 years labor camp in USSR. Together with 26 other German prisoners, hand-cuffed, he was transported by truck on 28 Dec 48 to the concentration camp SACHSENHAUSEN (5247N-1314E). On 29 Jun 49 he was deported to USSR, to the transit camp for all penal areas of USSR in ORSHA (5430N-3027E). He remained here till end of Aug 49, and was then transferred to VORKUTA. During all the period in VORKUTA, from Aug 49 to May 53, he was interned in Forced Labor Camp # 9, of Coal Mine # 8, Pt 16, Incl 1, report A. During the first time he worked as a general laborer in various overground projects of the mine. SOURCE soon found out, that for self survival he had to comprehend, to read and write Russian well. He therefore studied the language thoroughly, and made friends with a Russian prisoner of German descent, a certain Voloja HERZBERG. This man had a better education and was above average intelligence. He held the office of work distribution in camp. Through him SOURCE gained access to easier jobs and soon learned how to get by in the easiest manner. Thus he worked from Nov 49 to Mar 50 as norm and work checker for his camp, an official work control officer of all the outside work sites. He contacted many enterprisers and foremen personally, and then became involved in black market and other illegal transactions. He officially earned very little money and besides found the job too harrassing. At first opportunity he applied for work as foreman of the machinery stock on one of the mines galleries, and with the aid of his friend was accepted. Soon he was promoted			
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to overseer of mine hauling, that is elevating of coal and waste. On last Oct 50 he met with an accident and lost his left arm in a carambolage of mining cars in the elevating shaft. He was hospitalized from Nov 50 to Jan 51. In course of investigation of this accident which was believed to be sabotage, he was sent with special courier to MOSKVA (5545N-3737E). When he returned, he was appointed manager of the local coal storage and delivery. Here he worked from Jan 51 to Mar 51. The coal to be used in VORKUTA was hauled in mines # 17 and # 19. Special transport agents, so-called "expeditors" received the coal at the mines and transported them by RR to the storage. The gondolas could not be weighed and the contents, normally estimated, accepted by full loads as 15 tons. SOURCE knew that the expeditors sold coal on their own on the road, and refused to acknowledge full loads. The expeditors could not return to the mines for reloading, because no gondola had originally left the mine unless it was fully loaded. Thus SOURCE forced the expeditors to accept his receipt which was countersigned by the bribed guards as official witness. In this manner he gained on each trainload up to 10 tons of coal. The request for coal on the black market was extremely high and SOURCE was well overstocked, he made big profit by illegally selling coal. He earned as much as 7,000 rubles in 2 weeks time. It was not very difficult to dispatch the coal, because SOURCE had forms, already signed and stamped, to be issued for each truck hauling coal from the yard. As long as his issued certificates concerted in number with number of the incoming orders, nobody bothered him. As it frequently happened, one truck carried 2, sometimes even 3 orders at a time, and SOURCE had certificates in excess. Customers were the free employees of the mines and the military installations and officials. They had allowances of coal and were entitled to buy at the yard. Their order slips were issued and signed by the respective highest concerned offices. The officially known production cost of 1 ton coal was 96 rubles, the official sales price amounted to 120 rubles per ton. SOURCE sold the coal illegally for 200 to 250 rubles, and the outside black market price varied between 400 and 500 rubles per ton. The director of the coal mine # 8 and the CO of the VORKUTA/RUDNIK garrison were among the illegal customers and paid in cash and vodka as all others. SOURCE was comparatively safe because too many people were involved and knew of each other. These transactions were strictly personally and were never written. Thus SOURCE was known by many officers and other officials as trustworthy individual; his Russian had greatly improved. His health, however, was poor, he suffered already from lung illness and therefore tried to get an inside job. The camp security officer KOLESNIKOV who spoke German and English took him into his office as interpreter in Mar 51. After some time in internal office work SOURCE was given the office of camp commander which was always held by trustworthy prisoners. Nobody was really anxious to be commander, because the constant struggle with BLATNOIS was very harrassing and often proved fatal for the office holder. Since KOLESNIKOV personally befriended him, and KOLESNIKOV was feared by all the greatest extent, SOURCE accepted the office. He went in and out of KOLESNIKOV's office, met many high ranking officials of VORKUTA and in all maintained a profitable life. His job was interesting, and SOURCE carried a lot of responsibility. Besides the supervision of the internal order and cleanliness of the camp and the camp penal sections, such as "Karzer and isolators" he was responsible that all able prisoners went to work, respectively the sick reported at sick call. He received all the camp provision for the prisoners and the MVD guards and distributed the rations to the various kitchens. He was responsible for the correct feeding of the punished prisoners whose rations usually were cut down to various rates. His major office, however, was the supervision of the camp bookkeeping. The camp was paid for all work rendered outside of camp boundary, according to standard wages and the rate of the achieved filling of the norms. Camp's checkers verified the correct acknowledgement by the enterprizers or employers of prisoners of the work done. These installations and other employers had to pay 50 % of their earned wages to the camp. The other

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half was negotiated by account on behalf of the camp and paid to the government. The checking of the rendered service by the camp was not done to prevent overworking of the prisoners, but to eliminate the cheating of the camp in regard to funds, and to prevent underpayment. The rates were fixed, according to the type of work. Miners and underground laborers earned 60 rubles, skilled laborers in factory or repair shops between 60 and 80 rubles, mining foremen between 70 and 80 rubles, master miners 90 rubles, engineers and experts 100 rubles. The general laborer overground was paid between 40 and 50 rubles and their foremen between 50 and 60 rubles. All these wages were reckoned per day by 101 % filling of the norm. The work continued throughout the year without break, Sundays were not acknowledged, but all employers were granted 4 free days each month on which the prisoners had to work unpaid shifts. The government paid out of the 50 % earnings the upkeep, maintenance and the security apparatus, such as guards and administration, and in case of accidents to prisoners, their complete support. The official figure was 11 rubles per day and prisoner in VORKUTA. The camp accountant disposed of the prisoner's wages. According to earnings 16 to 19 rubles were deducted daily for board, lodging and clothing. Normally remained between 200 and 250 rubles for the working prisoner, 20 % of which were compulsory saved for an eventual personal fund to be paid out at termination of the penalty. Before 1952 the prisoners were fed in 4 groups, different in quality and quantity of food, according to the heaviness of labor rendered, and according to the degrees of their punishment. At that time prisoners never were paid in cash. The system changed in early 52. The issued food was equal for everybody, but was not enough to satisfy a normal healthy human being. The prisoners had money on hand and were allowed to buy at the camp store food and other necessities except for alcohol and luxuries. But again a cut device was installed to prevent prisoners having larger amounts of cash either in hand or on their personal account. Irregularly several times during the year check calls on clothing were held. Since the prisoners were personally responsible for their clothes, each lost or "willfully" torn item had to be paid for with 10 times the original price. Thusly many prisoners were heavily indebted to the camp and never came out of these debts. During this period when SOURCE was camp commander, he learned that everything and everybody could be bought and bribed. The prices varied, according to rank, position and need of the partner. The prisoners were without any scruples, they could not loose much anyway. If it came to the worst, their sentence could be prolonged; usually they got away with a few days solitary arrest. The corruption was so far spread and unofficially known by one and all that the profiteering was almost the normal standard in VORKUTA. Honest officials were practically unknown and unheard of. The general slogan of life in VORKUTA was "USSR IS LARGE AND MOSKVA IS FAR AWAY". The officials were in cahoots, one was known too well to the other to dare to turn traitor. Special care was taken that each partner committed himself equally at each illegal transaction; witnesses were called very often to attend in order to ensure the "safety" of the deal. All these illegal transactions were favored by an elaborate, but very inefficient control system of the RR freight traffic. The SRR lines on the far distances required several sub way stations with transloading and rearranging of trains and loads. Trains frequently arrived at VORKUTA without proper loading lists and warrants. The accompanying guards usually were careless and uninterested or easily bribed. Pilferage of loads and misleading information on whole trains or parts of the trains frequently happened. Any investigation on such discrepancies was very elaborately planned and employed a large staff, the results, however, were practically nil, because the offices concerned were either not cooperating or willfully misleading the interrogators. The local government with its officers deeply involved in the cause of these discrepancies did not investigate as long as the official book keeping of the achieved results in developing the district concerted with the requested fulfillment of the economical plans, and as long as the items on black market were used in developing the district, even in a round

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about way. The most important articles on black market were coal and bldg material. Alcohol only rated as means of bribery and on provisions no shortages seemed to exist. All and everybody seemed to have plenty of money, especially the free population. Their living standard seemed to be rather high. The women on the streets were well and expensively dressed and wore make up as good as ladies of European cities. Only the traffic with vehicles on the streets with its few private cars and official touring cars made the difference between E and W obvious and striking. Meanwhile SOURCE'S lung troubles got worse, and he saw no progress in his office as camp commander. Even as protegee of KOLESNIKOV he was not sure whether the BLATNOIS would not kill him eventually, same as 5 foremen who were murdered during his office time. In Aug 52 the job of a foreman at the waste disposal of coal mine # 8 was vacant and SOURCE stepped in. He knew that German PWs were to be repatriated soon and that the required number was not reached. As an invalid and sick prisoner he saw a chance to be added to the list for repatriation. In Dec 52 his ailment was so bad, that he was transferred to hospital; he nearly had overstrained himself by exposing his weak lungs to the cold winter climate. He was well treated in the hospital, and his health improved so much that he was transferred to the transit camp in TAPIAU (5439N-2105E) in May 53. Here again he was hospitalized until Dec 53 to be repatriated. He came to FRIEDLAND (5152N-0956E) on 28 Dec 53.

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REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable) 2-1100s				
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 112—Part II.)				
<p>I. PREAMBLE:</p> <p>SOURCE, interned in Russian Forced Labor Camp # 9, Pt 16, Incl 1, report A, in VORKUTA (6730N-6403E), from Aug 49 to May 53. From Jan 51 to Aug 52 he worked as so-called camp commander of camp # 9, ref to report C. Through the guards and guard officers he heard rumors of Americans in Soviet captivity in VORKUTA. This rumor was confirmed at early 1952 by the camp's security officer Feodor Nikolaevich KOLESNIKOV who actually stated that he had seen the American officers. Occasionally a personal conversation between SOURCE and the chief of the central department of state security, district VORKUTA, this major MISHANOV acknowledged personally the statement of KOLESNIKOV. Two of the prisoners were personally known to SOURCE.</p> <p>II. AMERICAN PRISONERS IN VORKUTA.</p> <p>Generally the most humane and best organized prisoner camp of VORKUTA known camp was the labor camp of the "VORKUT MECHANICHESKIY ZAVOD" (central mechanical repair shop). The most reliable and intelligent prisoners were interned here. The camp's postal number was unknown, however, SOURCE knew that the camp was listed as either # 23 or # 25 on the official work site ledger. Eight American prisoners were reported to be interned here. One prisoner was a Lt Col, two were Maj's, two Capt's, and two civilian engineers. The 8th prisoner was temporary inmate of camp # 9, and worked as miner in coal mine # 8 for a short while. SOURCE met him personally and talked to him. His name was sounding something like THOMSON or CHEMSON, usually he was called by his first name "JONY". This prisoner claimed to have been first engineer of an American vessel anchoring at PORT-ARTHUR (3847N-12110E), time and date unknown. The engineer went on short errand ashore, was arrested for illegally entering the harbor area, and sentenced to 6 or 7 years labor camp. His time should be up soon, but SOURCE doubted whether the Soviets would release him for good; he believed that the engineer would be compulsory settled somewhere in the URALS. Of all the other prisoners dates were not available. The Russians seemed to be proud of having American officers in custody. SOURCE met in hospital, 28 LAG OTDELENY SANGO-RODOK, 6 km N of suburb VORKUTA/PRETSHAKHTEN, one Canadian prisoner, suffering</p>				
<p>_____ INCL.</p>				
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from lung disease. The only detail known was that this prisoner was a member of the Canadian Air Force. He talked about all topics but refused to reveal any personal info. He was interned in the hospital from Jan 53 on and was still there when SOURCE left in May 53. All the other prisoners remained in VORKUTA, when SOURCE left in May 53.

Edward E Lundak
8 EDWARD E LUNDAK
Lt Col, USAF
Commander
7059TH AISS

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